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§ 1 - Introduction 
Monopolistic coalitional games (or more generally, mixed games) describe 
situations in which some of the players are" small," i. e., individually insignificant, 
whereas others are "large," i.e., individually significant. The main purpose of this work 
is to study the asymptotic nucleolus in such games. Since Shitovitz's (1973) seminal 
paper (which analyzed the core of large oligopolistic markets), many works on mixed 
markets have been written (for a comprehensive survey see Gabszewicz and Shitovitz 
(I 992)). Guesnerie (I977) and Gardner (I977) investigated the asymptotic behavior 
of the Shapley value in such markets. Legros (I989) deals with the nucleolus of a 
bilateral market with two complementary commodities. In this work we study the 
asymptotic nucleolus of large differentiable monopolistic coalitional games. 
Mathematically, we shall present the set of players by a measure space in which 
the small players form a non-atomic part and in which the large players are atoms. We 
assume that any atom has a monopolistic power, that is, the worth of a coalition which 
does not contain all the atoms is zero. In the asymptotic approach, a game with an 
infinite set of players is regarded as a limit of games with a finite set of players. 
We first prove (see Section 3) that if v is a monopolistic game of the form 
v = f 0 f..l, where f..l = (f..lj, ... ,f..lm) is a vector of measures and f'J{~ ~ 91+ is a 
non-decreasing concave function which is continuously differentiable in the interior of 
'J{~ , then the game v has an asymptotic nucleolus. We also provide an explicit 
formula for the asymptotic nucleolus. This formula implies that it coincides with the 
center of symmetry of the subset of the core of v in which all the atoms receive the 
same payoff. Actually, we prove a stronger result, namely that every sequence of 
payoff vectors which belongs to the kernels of any admissible sequence of finite 
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partition games which approximate the game v converges to the center of symmetry of 
the above mentioned subset of the core ofv (see Theorem 3.1 and Corollary 3.3). 
We note that any game of the above-mentioned form can be viewed as a large 
production game, where J.1 is the distribution of.the production factors among the 
owners and f is the production function. 
In Section 4 we apply the above-mentioned result to large monopolistic market 
games. We prove that under some mild conditions (on the untility funcitons of the 
traders) the asymptotic nucleolus of the transferable utility monopolstic market game 
which is associated with an economy with a finite number of types exists and coincides 
on the atomless part of the players' space with half of a competitive payoff distribution 
of the economy (see Proposition 4.1 and Theorem 4.3). 
§2 - Preliminaries 
In this section we define the basic notions which are relevant to our work. Let 
(T. I) be a measurable space, i.e., T is a set and I is a Cl -field of subsets of T. We 
refer to the member of T as players and to those of I as coalitions. A coalitional 
game, or simply a game on (T. I), is a function v: I ~ 9t with v(0) = O. If T is 
finite and I = 2 T is the set of all subsets of T. the game v will be called afinite game. 
A game v is superadditive if v( SI U S 2) ;::: v( SI) + v( S 2) whenever SI and S 2 are 
disjoint coalitions. A payoff measure in a game v on (T, I) is a bounded finitely 
additive measure A: I ~ 9t which satisfies A(T) ~ v(T). 
We denote by ba = ba(T,I) the Banach space of all bounded finitely additive 
measures on (T. I) with the variation norm. The subspace of ba which consists of all 
bounded countably additive measures on (T, I) is denoted by ca = ca(T, I). If A is 
a measure in ca then car A) = car T, I, A) denotes the set of all members of ca which 
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are absolutely continuous with respect to A. If A is a subset of an ordered vector 
space we denote by A+ the set of all non-negative members of A. 
Let K be a convex subset of an Euclidean space and let f: K ~ in be a concave 
function. A vector p is a 'iupf!rgradient of f at x E K if f ( y ) - f (x) ::; p . ( y - x) for 
all Y E K. The set of all supergradients of f at x will be denoted by of (x). It is well 
known that if x is an interior point of K then of (x) 7= 0 and f is differentiable at x iff it 
has a unique supergradient at x which, in this case, coincides with the gradient vector. 
For two vectors x,y in in m we write x ~ y to mean Xi ~ Yi for aliI::; i ::; m, 
x> Y to mean x ~ Y and x 7= y, and x» y to mean Xi > Yi for all 1::; i ::; m. A 
functionf defined on a set A c inm is called non-decreasing if for every X,Y E A we 
have x ~ y implies f (x) ~ f (y ). It is called increasing if, in addition, x > Y implies 
f(x) > fry)· 
§3 - The Asymptotic Behavior of the Kernel and the Nucleolus in Mixed Games 
In this section we investigate the asymptotic behavior of the kernel and the 
nucleolus in a class of mixed games. 
Let v be a finite game (that is, Tis finite and I = 2 T). If x E in/TI and SeT 
we define x( S) = L Xi if S 7= 0, and x(0) = O. Denote 
iES 
I(v) = {x E in lT 11 Xi ~ v({i}) for every i ET and x(T) = VeT)} 
and 
I * (v) = {x E in /TI I x( T) = v (T) } . 
For every i,j ET, i 7= j and x E in lT1 define 
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Sij(x) = max{v(S) - x(S) Is c T, i E S and} ~ S} 
The prekernel of the game v is the set 
PK(v) = {x El * (v) I Sij(x) = Sji(x) Vi,} ET, i ~ }}. 
The kernel of the game v is the set 
K( v) = {x E I ( v) I (s ij (x) - S j i (x)) (x j - v( {)} )) ~ 0 Vi,} E T, i ~ }} . 
It is well known that if v is a finite game which is zero mono tonic (that is, 
v(S u {in 2: v(S) + v({i}) for every Se Tand i E TI S), then PK(v) and K(v) 
coincide (see Theorem 2.7 in Maschler, Peleg and Shapley (1972)). For a further 
discussion of the kernel the reader is referred to Maschler (1992). 
Let v be a finite game. For every x E I (v), let B (x) be a 21T I-tuple whose 
components are the numbers v(S) - x(S), SeT, arranged in non-increasing order, 
i.e., Bi (x) 2: Bj(x) for 1 ~ i ~ } ~ 11. The nucleolus of the game v, denoted by Nv, is 
the payoff vector which is 11 closest" to v in the sense that B( Nv ) is the minimum in the 
lexicographic order of the set {B(x) I x El (v)}. It is well known that the nucleolus 
of a finite game v always exists when l( v) ~ 0 and it consists of a unique point which 
belongs to the kernel of v (e.g., Schmeidler (1969). 
In the rest of the paper we assume that a fixed measure A E ca+ (T, I) is 
given. We interpret A as a population measure, that is, if S is a coalition, then A(S) is 
the proportion of the total population which is contained in S. We also assume that T 
can be represented in the form T = 1'0 u 'Fj, where 1'0 and 'Fj are non-empty disjoint 
coalitions, the restriction of A to (To, ITo) is non-atomic (where, here and in the 
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sequel, if S is a coalition IS = {Q E I IQ cS} ) and Tj is a finite set of atoms of A 
such that every subset of Tj is in I . 
Let v be a game on (T, I) and let 7f be a finite subfield of I. The set of all 
atoms of " 'is denoted by A". The set of all subsets of A" is identified naturally with 
1[ , and thus a finite game with a set of players A1[ is identified with a function 
w: 7f --+ 9t with w(0) = O. The restriction of the game v to " is denoted by v". An 
admissible sequence of finite fields is an increasing sequence (7fn ):=1 of finite 
00 
subfields of I such that every subset of Tj is in 7f1 and U tfn generates I. 
n=1 
Let v be a superadditive game on (T, I). It is said that v has an asymptotic 
nucleolus if there exists a game If'V such that, for every admissible sequence of finite 
fields (7f/1)00_1 and every Sin 7f1, lim. NV1[ (S) exists and equals If'v(S). It 
/1- 11-+00 11 
follows that If'V Eba, and it is called the asymptotic nucleolus of the game v. 
The asymptotic approach was introduced in Kannai (1966) in the context of the 
Shapley value of non-atomic games (see also chapter In of Aumann and Shapley 
(1974». 
We are now ready to state and prove the main result of this section. 
Theorem 3.1 
Let Jl = (Jl1,"', Jlm) be a vector of non-trivial measures in ca+ (A) , Assume 
that f: 9t ~ --+ 9t + zs a non-decreasing concave function which is continuously 
differentiable in int 9t~ and satisfies, Vf(Jl(T))» 0 and f(Jl(T\ {a})) = 0 for every 
a E Tj. Then the game v = f 0 Jl has an a::,ymptotic nucleolus, Moreover, if 
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(Jrn ):=1 is an admissible sequence affinite fields and xn E K (v;r.) for every n J 
then for every S E Jr 1 we have 
Let (Jrn ): = 1 be an admissible sequence of finite fields. We first show that if 
S E Jrl n IT and xn E K(v" ) for every 11, then !im xn (S) = ~ V'f(,u(T)). ,u(S) . 
o • n~oo ~ 
Note that sincefis non-decreasing the game v is superadditive. Therefore, for every n, 
the game v;r. is zero-monotonic, and thus K( v;r.) = PK( v;r.) for every n. Let n be a 
fixed natural number and let j E Jrn n ITo. Assume that xn E K( v". ). Then for 
every i E'0 we have 
and 
Since xn E PK( v".) , we have 
Therefore 
Since f is concave and differentiable, 
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Thus, 
Let 8 > O. As f is continuously differentiable on in! 9t ~ , there exists <5 > 0 
such that for every x E 91 ~ we have 
where e = (J,l, ... ,l). Since PI,"" Pm are absolutely continuous with respect to A and 
the restriction of A to (To, I To) is non-atomic, there exists a natural number no such 
that 11.u(J)11 < <5 for every j Elrna n ITa' Therefore by (3.1) and (3.2), for every 
17 ?: 170 and j E lrn n IT we have o 
Let S E lr I nIT . Then S is the union of members of lr n for every n. 
a 
Therefore for every n ?: no 
Since 8 is arbitrary, we have 
We now show that limxn(S)?: f Vf(.u(T)) . .u(S). Sincefis continuously 
differentiable on int 91~ and Vf(.u(T))» 0 ,-there exists g > 0 such that for every 
X E 91 111 we have + 
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Let 11 J be a natural number such that 1I,u(J )11 < 8 for every j E Jr n 1 n ITo . 
Then 
Therefore by (3. 1), for every 11 ~ 11 1 and j E Jr n n IT we have 
a 
Hence, 
Now there exists a natural number 112 ~ 11 J such that for every 11 ~ 112 and 
j E Jr/1 n IT we have 
a 
(3.4) 
(note that sincefis concave, f(; ,u(T)) ~ ~ f( ,u(T)) > 0). 
Let 11 ~ 112 be fixed and let i E Tj and j E Jrn n ITa' Choose Qn C Jrn such 
Let Sn = u I. We show that Sn:::> TJ . Assume not. Then v(Sn) = 0 , and 
IEQn 
thus x /1 (J) = X n (Sn ) ~ X n ({ i}). Since all the players in Tj are interchangeable in the 
game vtr (two players in a finite game are interchangeable if they have the same . 
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marginal contribution to every coalition which does not contain them), they get the 
same payoff in every member of K( v"n ). Hence, 
Since f is concave and differentiable, 
Therefore SI1 ~ Tj , and thus there exists 511 E I To such that Sn = (T \ j) \ S n' Hence, 
Thus 
By (3.3) 
Since f is concave, 
Therefore, 
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Hence, 
This implies that !im xn (S) ;::: ~ V'f(,u(T)). ,u(S) . 
Assume now that S E trj is any coalition. Then for every natural number n we have 
Let tn be the payoff which is assigned by Xn to a player in Tj . Then 
Therefore, 
Let v be a game on (T,..r). The core of v, denoted by Core(v), is the set of all payoff 
measures ,u E ba such that ,u(S) ;::: v(S) for every S E I . 
We want to determine the location in the core of the asymptotic nucleolus of a game 
which satisfies the conditions of Theorem 3.1. We first state and prove a representation 
theorem for the core of such games. 
Theorem 3.2 
Let ,u = (,ui , ... ,,um) be a vector of non-trivial measures in ca+(A). Assume that 
f: 9\~ ~ 9\+ is a concave function which is differentiable at Ji (lJ and satisfies 
f(,u( T \ {a} )) = 0 for every a E Tj. Then the core of the game v = f o,u is given by 
Core( v) = {~ E ca+ (A) I ~(T) = f(,u(T)) and 'VS E ITo' ~(S) ~ V'f(,u( T)) . ,u(S)} 
12 
Let 
M(v) = {~ECa+(IL) I ~(T) = f(,u(T)) and VS EITo ' ~(S) ~ Vf(,u(T)) .,u(S)} . 
We will show (lat M( v) = C ore( v). We first show that M( vJ c Core ( v) . Let ~ E M( v) ~nd 
S E I. Now if S does not include T] then v(S) = 0 and clearly, ~ (S) ;:: v(S). If S ::::l T] then 
TI SeTa. As ~ E M(v), 
~(T \ S) ~ Vf(,u(T))· ,u(TI S) . 
Therefore 
As f is concave, 
v (S) = f(,u(S)) ~ f(,u(T)) - Vf(,u(T)).,u (T \ S) . 
Hence, ~ (S) ;:: v(S) , and thus ~ E Core{v) . 
It remains to show that Core{v) c M{v). Let ~ E Core(v). Then for every S E I we 
have 
(3.4) O~~(S)~~{T)-v(TIS). 
As fis continuous at ,u (T) and ,u] , ... ,,um are in ca+ (IL) , the inequality in (3.4) implies that 
~ E ca + (IL). Since the restriction of IL to (To, ITa) is non-atomic, the restrictions of 
,u],···,,um and~ to (To,ITo) are also non-atomic. Let SEITo. We will show that 
~ (S) ~ V f(,u( T)) . ,u(S) . By Lyapunov's theorem, for every 0 < a < 1 there exists a coalition 
Sa E ITa such that ,u(Sa) = a,u(S) and ~ (Sa) = a~ (S). Asfis differentiable at ,u (T), for 
every 0 < a < 1 we have 
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f(,u(TI Sa)) = f(,u(T)) - aVf(,u(T)).,u (S) + o(a). 
As ~ E Core(v), we have 
~ (Sa) = ~ (T) - ~ (T \ Sa) ~ f(,u( T)) - f (,u( T \ Sa)) . 
Hence, 
~ (s) ~ 'Yf(,u(T)).,u (S) + g(a) , 
where fim g{a) = O. Therefore ~ (S) ~ Vf(,u(T))·,u (S), and the proof is complete. Q.E.D. 
a~o 
Let A be a subset of a linear space. A point Xo E A is called a center of symmetry of A 
if for every x EA, the point 2 Xo - x also belongs to A. Note that if A is bounded, there may 
be at most one center of symmetry. 
The following corollary is a direct consequence of Theorems 3.1 and 3.2. 
Corollary 3.3 
Let ,u = (,u] ,.·.,,urn) be a vector of non-trivial measures in ca+ (A). Assume that 
f: 9t~ ~ 9t+ is a non-decreasing concave function which is differentiable in int 9t~ and 
satisfies, Vf(,u(T))» 0 and f(,u(TI {an) = 0 for every a E 'Fj. Then the asymptotic 
nucleolus of the game v = f o,u coincides with the center of symmetly of the subset of the 
core ofv in which all the members of 'Fj receive the same payoff 
§4 - Market Games 
In this section we apply Theorem 3.1 to games which arise in economic applications. 
We consider a pure exchange economy E in which the commodity space is 9t ~ . The 
traders' space is represented by the measure space (T, £, A). We assume again 
that T = To U 'Fj, where To and 'Fj are non-empty and disjoint coalitions, T] is a finite set of 
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atoms of A such that every subset of TJ is in I , and the restriction of A to (To, IT 0) is 
non-atomic. We will interpret the members of TJ as monopolists. Every trader t ET has a 
utility jUllction Ut,' W~ ~ W+. An assignment in E is an integrable function x,' T ~ 9t~. 
There is a fixed initial assignment 0) (O)(t) represents the initial bundle density of trader t). 
An allocation is an assignment x such that frxdA::; frO)dA. A tramferable utility 
competitive equilibrium (t.u.c.e.) of the economy E is a pair (x,p) , where x is an allocation 
and p E W~ , such that for all t ET, Ut (x) - p' (x - O)(t)) attains its maximum (over W~) at 
x = x(t). The measure rp (S) = fs[ut(x(t)) - p. (x(!) - O)(t))] dA (when the function 
Ut (x(t)) is integrable) is called the competitive payoff distribution; and p is the vector 
competitive prices. We assume the following 
(4.2) For every trader a E TJ there exists a commodity 1::; ka ::; m such that O)k (t) = 0 for 
a 
every lET', {a} (where O)k denotes the ka -component of 0)). 
a 
The meaning of (4.2) is that every atom of A has a corner on one of the commodities 
in the economy. 
We restrict our analysis to two cases: (1) when every trader in E has the same utility 
function and (2) when E has a finite number of types. 
Denote by U the set of all functions u: 9t ~ ~ 9t + which are continuous and concave 
on 9t~ , continuously differentiable and increasing on the interior of 9t~ and vanish on the 
boundary of W~ . Note that any differentiable neoclassical utility function is in U (see 
Definition 1.4.2 in Aliprantis, Brown and Burkinshaw (1989». 
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We first study the case in which all the traders in the economy E has the same utility 
function u: iR~ ~ R+. We assume that U E U and that u is homogeneous of degree one on 
'R~ (note that, for example, any Cobb-Douglas utility function satisfies these assumptions). 
The Aumann-Shapley Shubik market game which is associated with the economy E (see 
Shapley and Shubik (1969) and Section 30 of Aumann and Shapley (1974» in this special case 
is defined by 
(4.3) v(S) = sup{fsu(x (t))dA Ix is an assignment such that fsxdA = fsmdA } 
Proposition 4.1 
AsslIme that the economy E sati~fies (-/.1) and (.:/.2) and that every trader in E has the 
same utility function liEU which is also homogeneolls of degree one. Then the market game 
v which is defined in (-/.3) has an asymptotic nucleolus If/v which is given by 
(4.4) 
Moreover, there exists a competitive payoff distribution cp which corresponds to a t.u.c.e. of 
J 
E slIch that If/ v(S) = ? cp(S) for every S E IT . 
~ 0 
We first note that for every S E I, v(S) = u( f s m dA). Indeed, let S E I. Then by 
the definition of v, we have v(S) ~ ud s m dA). Since u is concave and homogeneous of 
degree one, by Jensen's inequality, for every assignment x such that f SX dA = f s m dA we 
have fsu(x (t))dA::; UdsmdA). Therefore v(S) = UdsmdA). Now, since u vanishes on 
the boundary of iR~, by (4.2), for every a E 1] we have v(TI {an = ud { }mdA) = O. 
TI a 
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Also the assumption that u is increasing in the interior of 9\ ~ implies that VurJ r C!) d2) » 0 . 
Thus the game v satisfies the requirements of Theorem 3.1 and therefore (4.4) is satisfied. Let 
b = SrC!) d2. Since u is homogeneous of degree one, by Euler's theorem VU(b). b = u(b). As 
u is concave, for every x E 9\~ we have 
u(x) ::; u(b) + Vu(b)· (x - b) = Vu(b)· x . 
Therefore max (u(x) - Vu(b)· x) = o. Consequently, for every t ET we have 
xE9\~ 
max (u(x) - Vu(b)· (x - C!) (t))) = VU(b). C!) (t) . 
XE9\~ 
Let q; = V u(b) . S C!) d2. Then q; is a competitive payoff distribution in E and 'l'v(S) = ~ q;(S) 
for every S E.Er . 
o 
Q.E.D. 
We now analyze the case when there is a finite number of traders' types in the 
economy E. Two traders are of the same type if they have identical initial bundles and 
identical utility functions. We assume that the number of different types of traders in 
To is ll. For every 1::; i ::; n, we denote by Si the set of traders in Ta which are of 
type i. We assume that Si is measurable (i.e., Si E 1') and Il.(Si) > o. The utility 
function of the traders of type i (J::; i ::; n) is denoted by ui, and their initial bundle by 
cv i. We assume that for every 1 si::; n, ui E U and in addition Ui is homogeneous of 
degree one. We also assume that for every a E TJ the utility function ua of the trader a 
is in U (but not necessarily homogeneous of degree one). The Aumann-Shapley-Shubik 
- market game which is associated with the economy E in this case of finite number of 
types is 
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where, X(S) = {xl x is an assignment such that f s xdA = f sO) dA} . 
Define a function f: 9{~ -+ 9{ + by 
(4.6) f(y)=max{ L A ({a})ua(Xa) + IUi(Xi) 
aET] 1=1 
Xa,Xi E9{~, L A ({a})xa + I Xi ::;y} 
a ET] i=1 
Since the utility functions of the traders are continuous and concave, it is easy to see 
that f is well defined and concave on 9{ ~ . 
Lemma 4.2 
Let v be the market game in (4.5), then v(S) = fdsO) dA)for every SE £, 
wherefis given by (4.6). 
Let S E £. Assume first that S does not include Tj. Then by (4.2), fsO) dA 
belongs to the boundary of 9{ ~. Since the utility functions of the traders in T vanish 
on the boundary of 9l ~ , we have v(S) = 0 and f ( f sO) dA) = o. So assume that 
n 
f(fscodA) = LA({a})ua(xa)+ IUi(Xi). aE~ i=1 
Define an assignment x by x(t) = xt if t E T1 and for every t E Si (J ::; i ::; n) 
18 
otherwise 
Then 
Therefore v(s) ~ fsUt(x(t))dIL. Since the Ui are homogeneous of degree one, 
It remains to show that v(S) s: fdscvdIL). Letx be an assignment such that 
fsxd)" = fscvdIL. For every a E TJ let xa =x(a) and for every 1 s:i s: n let 
Xi = fsns, x dIL. Then 
n 
LIL ({an Xa + LXi = fsxdIL = fscv dIL 
aET] i=J 
Therefore by the definition off, we have 
n 
Id cvdIL)~ LIL({a})ua(Xa)+Llli(Xi) 
s aET1 i=J 
Since the lIi are concave and homogeneous of degree one, 
As x was an arbitrary assignment which satisfies fsx dIL = fscv dIL , we obtain that 
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Lemma 4.3 
The/unction/which is defined in (4.6) is continuously differentiable on 
We first show that / is differentiable at every point in the interior of m ~. Let 
y* Eint m~. Then from the definition of/it is clear that /(y *) > o. Since/is 
concave on in ~ , it is sufficient to show that o/(y *) consists of a unique point. Let 
(X;) and (xt)n be such that 
aeT1 1=1 
n 
/(y*)= LA ({a}) ua(x;)+ LUi(Xt) 
aeT} i=1 
Since the utility functions of the traders are non-decreasing, we have 
n 
LA({a})x~ + Lxt =y* 
i=l 
Since /(y *) > 0, the assumption that the utility functions of the traders vanish on the 
boundary of m:1 implies that there exists J E Tj U {1, ... ,11} such that x; E int m':. 
Assume first that 1$J$n. We will show that O/(y*)couAx;). Let P EO/(y*). 
Then for every x E in ~ we have 
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Uj(x) - uAx;) = Uj(X) + LA ({a})ua(x;) + LUi(xt) 
aET] i:t:. j 
-uAx;)- LA ({a})ua(x;)- LUi(Xt)~ 
aET] i:t:. j 
J(x+ LA ({a})x; + Lxt)-J(Y*)~P·(x-x;). 
aET] i:t:.j 
Thus P E O'u Ax;) and O'J(Y *) c O'uAx;). Since Uj is differentiable at x;, we have 
for every x E 9\~1 we define u/x) = A ({J})Uj(x). Then the above argument implies 
that c3 J(Y *) = {VUj (x j)}. Thus, in any case 0' J(Y *) consists of a unique point, and 
thereforeJis differentiable at Y *. The assumption that the utility funcitons of the 
traders are increasing in in! 9\ ': implies that V J ( f T lV dA) > > O. Now since J is 
concave on 9\':, it is continuous on in! 9\~. Moreover, since the utility functions of 
the traders vanish on the boundary of 9\~1 it is easy to see thatJis also continuous on 
the boundary of 9\~1. Now Proposition 39.1 of Aumann and Shapley (1974) asserts 
that any continuous concave function on 9\~1 which is differentiable on int 9\~ is 
continuously differentiable in int 9\':. Therefore J is continuously differentiable on 
int 9\'!!.. Q.E.D. 
We are now ready to state and prove the main result of this section. 
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Theorem 4.4 
Assume that the economy E sati.~fies (ll), (4.2) and also 
(1) There is afinite number n of traders' types in To' 
(2) Theutilityfunctions u], ... ,un of the traders in To are in Uandinadditionthey 
are homogeneous of degree one on 9i ~I • 
(3) The utility functions {ua } a ET] of the traders in TJ are in U. 
Letf be the function which is given by (4.6). Then the market game v which is defined 
ill (-1.5) has an a!:Jymptotic nucleolus 'fI v which is given by 
(-1.7) 
Moreover, there exists a competitive payoff distribution cp which corresponds to a 
. ] 
t.u.c.e. in the economy E such that 'fIv(S) = -2 !peS) for eve,y S ELT . 
() 
(4.7) follows from Theorem 3.1 and Lemmata 4.2 and 4.3. Denote 
b = f OJ dA. Let (x~) and (xt)~ be such that 
T aET] 1=] 
n {x; t E Tj 
f(b) = LA ({a})ua(x;) + ~Ui(Xn. For every t ET, let x*(t) = * 
a eT] 1-] Xi t E Si 
Then by a similar argument to that which was used in the proof of Lemma 4.3, we 
obtain that for every t ET and x E 9i!' 
(4.8) Ut(x)~Ut(x*(t))+\7f(b) .(x-x*(t)). 
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Since/is non-decreasing on 9t~I, V/Cb) ? O. Let 15, i 5, m. Now if Xj* is on 
the boundary of m~l, then Uj{xt) = 0, and thus by (4.8), Ui(X) - V/Cb) . x 5, 0 for 
every x E m~. If xt Eint m~, then V/Cb) = VUi{X;). Since Uj is homogeneous 
of degree one, VUj( xn· xt = Uj (xn. Therefore we again have by (4.8), 
Ui(X) - V/Cb) . x 5, 0 for every x E m~ and thus 
max (uJx) - V/Cb) .x) = 0 
xE9\~l 
This implies that for every t E T 
max (u/x) - V/(b)· (x - m (t))) = V/(b)· m (t). 
XE~~l 
Now by (4.8), for every a E TJ and t ET we have 
max (ua(x)-V/(h).(x-m (t)))=ua(x;)-V/(b).(x; -m (t)). 
XE~'!.l 
For every t ET let 
{
lit (x * (t)) - V/(b). (x * (t) - m (I)) 
get) = 
V/(b)· m (t) 
For every SE.E define rp (S) = fsgd1. Thenrp is a competitive payoff distribution in 
J 
the economy E and for every S E .ETa we have 'IIv(S) = '2 IP(S). Q.E.D. 
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THE ASYMPTOTIC NUCLEOLUS OF LARGE MONOPOLISTIC GAMES· 
Ezra Einy, Diego Moreno and Benyamin Shitovitzt 
Abstract 
We study the asymptotic nucleolus of large differentiable monopolistic games. We show that if v 
is a monopolistic game which is a composition of a non-decreasing concave and differentiable 
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§ 1 - Introduction 
Monopolistic coalitional games (or more generally, mixed games) describe 
situations in which some of the players are "small," i.e., individually insignificant, 
whereas others are "large," i.e., individually significant. The main purpose of this work 
is to study the asymptotic nucleolus in such games. Since Shitovitz's (1973) seminal 
paper (which analyzed the core of large oligopolistic markets), many works on mixed 
markets have been written (for a comprehensive survey see Gabszewicz and Shitovitz 
(1992». Guesnerie (1977) and Gardner (1977) investigated the asymptotic behavior 
of the Shapley value in such markets. Legros (1989) deals with the nucleolus of a 
bilateral market with two complementary commodities. In this work we study the 
asymptotic nucleolus of large differentiable monopolistic coalitional games. 
Mathematically, we shall present the set of players by a measure space in which 
the small players form a non-atomic part and in which the large players are atoms. We 
assume that any atom has a monopolistic power, that is, the worth of a coalition which 
does not contain all the atoms is zero. In the asymptotic approach, a game with an 
infinite set of players is regarded as a limit of games with a finite set of players. 
We first prove (see Section 3) that if v is a monopolistic game of the form 
v = f 0 f-l, where f-l = ( f-ll,···, f-lm) is a vector of measures and f 9i~ ~ ~H+ is a 
non-decreasing concave function which is continuously differentiable in the interior of 
9i~, then the game v has an asymptotic nucleolus. We also provide an explicit 
formula for the asymptotic nucleolus. This formula implies that it coincides with the 
center of symmetry of the subset of the core of v in which all the atoms receive the 
same payoff. Actually, we prove a stronger result, namely that every sequence of 
payoff vectors which belongs to the kernels of any admissible sequence of finite 
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partition games which approximate the game v converges to the center of symmetry of 
the above mentioned subset of the core ofv (see Theorem 3.1 and Corollary 3.3). 
We note that any game of the above-mentioned form can be viewed as a large 
production game, where f.L is the distribution of the production factors among the 
owners and/is the production function. 
In Section 4 we apply the above-mentioned result to large monopolistic market 
games. We prove that under some mild conditions (on the untility funcitons of the 
traders) the asymptotic nucleolus of the transferable utility monopolstic market game 
which is associated with an economy with a finite number of types exists and coincides 
on the atomless part of the players' space with half of a competitive payoff distribution 
of the economy (see Proposition 4.1 and Theorem 4.3). 
§2 - Preliminaries 
In this section we define the basic notions which are relevant to our work. Let 
(T, J:) be a measurable space, i.e., Tis a set and J: is a (J" -field of subsets of T. We 
refer to the member of T as players and to those of I as coalitions. A coalitional 
game, or simply a game on (T, J: ), is a function v: J: ~ 9t with v( 0) = o. If T is 
finite and J: = 2 T is the set of all subsets of T, the game v will be called afinite game. 
A game v is superadditive if v( S 1 u S 2) ~ v( SI) + v( S 2) whenever SI and S 2 are 
disjoint coalitions. Apayoffmeasure in a game v on (T,J:) is a bounded finitely 
additive measure A:;; ~ 9t which satisfies A(T) ~ v(T). 
We denote by ba = ba(T,;;) the Banach space of all bounded finitely additive 
measures on (T,;;) with the variation norm. The subspace of ba which consists of all 
bounded countably additive measures on (T,;;) is denoted by ca = ca(T,;;). If A is 
a measure in ca then car A) = ca(T,;;,A) denotes the set of all members of ca which 
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are absolutely continuous with respect to A.. If A is a subset of an ordered vector 
space we denote by A+ the set of all non-negative members of A. 
Let K be a convex subset of an Euclidean space and let f: K ~ m be a concave 
function. A vector p is a supergradient of f at x E K if / ( Y ) - f (x) ~ p . ( Y - x) for . 
all Y E K. The set of all supergradients of f at x will be denoted by (} f (x). It is well 
known that if x is an interior point of K then (} f (x) ~ 0 and f is differentiable at x iff it 
has a unique supergradient at x which, in this case, coincides with the gradient vector. 
For two vectors X,Y in mmwe write x ~ y to mean Xi ~ Yi for all I ~ i ~ m, 
x > Y to mean x ~ Y and x ~ y , and x» y to mean Xj > Yj for all I ~ i ~ m. A 
functionf defined on a set A c 9tm is called non-decreasing if for every X,Y E A we 
have x ~ Y implies f (x) ~ f (y ). It is called increasing if, in addition, x > y implies 
f(x) > fry). 
§3 - The Asymptotic Behavior of the Kernel and the Nucleolus in Mixed Games 
In this section we investigate the asymptotic behavior of the kernel and the 
nucleolus in a class of mixed games. 
Let v be a finite game (that is, Tis finite and I = 2 T). If x E 9t IT1 and SeT 
we define x(S) = LXi if S ~ 0, and x(0) = O. Denote 
iES 
and 
I * (v) = {x E 9t I TI I x( T) = v (T) } . 
For every i,j ET, i ~ j and x E 9t IT1 define 
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Sij(X) = max{v(S) - x(S) Is c T, i E S and} ~ S} 
The prekernel of the game v is the set 
PK(v) = {x El * (v) I Sij(X) = Sji(X) '\/i,} ET, i;f. i}. 
The kernel of the game v is the set 
K(v) = {x E I(v) I (Sij(x) - sji(x)) (x j - v({J})) ~ 0 ,\/i,i ET, i;f. i}. 
It is well known that if v is a finite game which is zero monotonic (that is, 
v(5 u {i}) 2:: v(5) + v({i}) for every 5 c T and i E TI 5), then PK(v) and K(v) 
coincide (see Theorem 2.7 in Maschler, Peleg and Shapley (1972». For a further 
discussion of the kernel the reader is referred to Maschler (1992). 
Let v be a finite game. For every x E I (v), let e (x) be a 21T I-tuple whose 
components are the numbers v(S) - x(S), SeT, arranged in non-increasing order, 
i.e., ej (x) 2:: ej(x) for 1 ~ i ~ i ~ 11. The nucleolus of the game v, denoted by Nv, is 
the payoff vector which is "closest" to v in the sense that e( Nv) is the minimum in the 
lexicographic order of the set { e( x) I x E I (v)}. It is well known that the nucleolus 
of a finite game v always exists when I( v) ;f. 0 and it consists of a unique point which 
belongs to the kernel ofv (e.g., Schmeidler (1969». 
In the rest of the paper we assume that a fixed measure A E ca+ (T, 1:') is 
gIven. We interpret A as a population measure, that is, if 5 is a coalition, then ..1,(5) is 
the proportion of the total population which is contained in S. We also assume that T 
can be represented in the form T = To u T], where 1'0 and T] are non-empty disjoint 
coalitions, the restriction of A to (To, 1:'To) is non-atomic (where, here and in the 
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sequel, if S is a coalition Is = {Q E I IQ cS} ) and '0 is a finite set of atoms of A. 
such that every subset of '0 is in I . 
Let v be a game on (T, I) and let lr be a finite subfield of I. The set of all 
atoms of ;r 'is denoted by A;r. The set of all subsets of A;r is identified naturally with 
;r , and thus a finite game with a set of players A;r is identified with a function 
w: lr ~ 9t with w(0) = O. The restriction of the game v to ;r is denoted by v;r. An 
admissible sequence of finite fields is an increasing sequence (lrl1 ):=1 offinite 
et) 
subfields of I such that every subset of '0 is inlrl and U lrl1 generates I. 
11=1 
Let v be a superadditive game on (T, I). It is said that v has an asymptotic 
nucleolus if there exists a game If v such that, for every admissible sequence of finite 
fields (lrl1 )oo_1 and every Sin lrl' Iim. NV;r (5) exists and equals Ifv(5). It 11 - 11 --7 00 11 
follows that If V Eba, and it is called the asymptotic nucleolus of the game v. 
The asymptotic approach was introduced in Kannai (1966) in the context of the 
Shapley value of non-atomic games (see also chapter In of Aumann and Shapley 
(1974». 
We are now ready to state and prove the main result of this section. 
Theorem 3.1 
Let P = (PI,"" Pm) be a vector of non-trivial measures in ca+ (A.) . Assume 
that f: 9t ~ ~ 9t + zs a non-ciecreasing concave function which is continuously 
differentiable in int 9t~ and satisfies, Vf(p(T»)» 0 and f(p(TI {a})) = 0 for every 
a E '0. Then the game v = fop has an a~ymptotic nucleolus, Moreover, if 
7 
(Jrn)oc, is an admissible sequence of finite field~' and xn E K (v Jr ) for every n. 
n=1 • 
then for every S E Jr I we have 
Let (JrI1 ):=1 be an admissible sequence of finite fields. We first show that if 
SE Jrl n IT and xl1 E K(vJr ) for every n, then /im xl1 (S) = -21 Vj(,u(T)). ,u(S). 
o • I1~OO 
Note that sincefis non-decreasing the game v is superadditive. Therefore, for every n, 
the game v Jr. is zero-monotonic, and thus K( v Jr. ) = P K( v Jr. ) for every n. Let n be a 
fixed natural number and let j E JrI1 n ITo' Assume that xn E K( v Jr
n 
). Then for 
every i E Tl we have 
and 
Sij(XI1 ) ~ v( T\ j) - xl1 (T) + xn(J) = f{,u( TI j)) - f(,u(T)) + xl1 (J) 
Since xn E PK( vJrn ) , we have 
Therefore 
Since j is concave and differentiable, 
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Thus, 
Let & > O. As / is continuously differentiable on int 91: , there exists <5 > 0 
such that for every x E 91: we have 
where e = (J,1, ... ,1). Since Pi,"" Pm are absolutely continuous with respect to A and 
the restriction of A to (To, IT 0) is non-atomic, there exists a natural number no such 
that IIJI(J )11 < <5 for every j E Jr no n ITa' Therefore by (3.1) and (3.2), for every 
11 ~ no and j E Jr/1 n IT we have 
o 
Let S E Jr i nIT . Then S is the union of members of Jr/1 for every 11. 
o 
Therefore for every n ~ no 
Since & is arbitrary, we have 
We now show that limxn(S) ~ ~ Vj(p(T)). p(S). Since/is continuously 
differentiable on int 91: and Vj(p(T))» 0 ,·there exists 8 > 0 such that for every 
x E 91~ we have 
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IIX - ,u(T)11 < 8 => Vf(x) ~ % vf(,u(T)). 
Let 11 j be a natural number such that 1I,u{J )11 < 8 for every j E 7r n 1 n ITo . 
Then 
Therefore by (3.1), for every 11 ~ 11 j and j E 7r n n Ir we have 
o 
Hence, 
(3.3) xn(S) ~ ~ Vf(,u(T)). ,u(S) 
Now there exists a natural number 112 ~ 11 j such that for every n ~ 112 and 
j E trn n IT we have o 
(3.4) 
(note that sincefis concave, f(; ,u(T)) ~ ~ f( ,u(T)) > 0). 
Let 11 ~ 112 be fixed and let i E Tj and j E trn n Ir . Choose Qn C trn such o 
that {i} E Qn' j (l Qn and 
Let Sn = u I. We show that Sn:J Tj . Assume not. Then v(Sn) = 0, and 
leQn 
thus xn(J) = xn(Sn) ~ xn({i}). Since all the players in Tj are interchangeable in the 
game v" (two players in a finite game are interchangeable if they have the same 
. 
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marginal contribution to every coalition which does not contain them), they get the 
same payoff in every member of K( v Jr. ). Hence, 
Sincefis concave and differentiable, 
Thus, xn({i});::: 1:1 f{~ fl{T)). Since xn(j);::: xn({i}). this contradicts (3.4). 
Therefore Sn =:J Tj , and thus there exists Sn E I To such that Sn = (T \ j) ': S n' Hence, 
Thus 
By (3.3) 
Since f is concave, 
Therefore, 
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Hence, 
Xn(S) ~ ~ Vf(,u(T)). ,u(S) for every n ~ n2. 
This implies that lim xn (S) ~ ~ Vf(,u( T») . ,u(S) . 
Assume now that S E re 1 is any coalition. Then for every natural number n we have 
Let In be the payoff which is assigned by xn to a player in Tj. Then 
Therefore, 
Let v be a game on (T, I). The core of v, denoted by C ore (v ), is the set of all payoff 
measures ,u E ba such that ,u(S) ~ v(S) for every S E I. 
We want to determine the location in the core of the asymptotic nucleolus of a game 
which satisfies the conditions of Theorem 3.1. We first state and prove a representation 
theorem for the core of such games. 
Theorem 3.2 
Let ,u = (,ul ,···,,um) be a vector o/non-trivial measures in ca+(A). Assume that 
/:91~ -+ 91+ is a concave/unction which is differentiable at fl (J) and satisfies 
f(,u( T \ {a})) = 0 for every a E Tj. Then the core of the game v = f 0 fl is given by 
Core(v) = {~Eca+(A) I ~(T) = f(,u(T») and VS E ITo' ~(S) ~ V/(,u(T»). ,u(S)} 
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M(v) = {q ECa+(A) I q(T) = f(,u(T)) and VS EITo' q(S) $ Vf(,u(T)). ,u(S)} . 
We will show that M(v) = Core{v). We fir;;t show that M{v) c Core(v). Letq E M(v) and 
S E I. Now if S does not include 7J then v(S) = 0 and clearly, q (S) 2: v(S). If S :::> T] then 
TIS eTa. As q EM(v), 
q(T IS) $ Vf(,u(T)). ,u(T I S) . 
Therefore 
q (S) = q (T) - q (TI S) 2: q (T) - Vf(,u(T)).,u (TI S) = f(,u(T)) - Vf(,u(T))·,u (TI S) . 
Asfis concave, 
Hence, q(S) 2: V(S) , and thus q ECore(v). 
It remains to show that C ore( v) c M( v). Let q E C ore( v). Then for every S E I we 
have 
(3.4) 0 $ q(S) $ q(T) -v(TIS). 
Asfis continuous at ,u (T) and ,u], ... ,,um are in ca+(A) , the inequality in (3.4) implies that 
q E ca+ (A). Since the restriction of A to (To, IT 0) is non-atomic, the restrictions of 
Ji],··.,Jim and'; to (To,ITo) are also non-atomic. Let SEI To ' We will show that 
.; (S) $ V f(,u(T)). ,u(S) . By Lyapunov's theorem, for every 0 < a < 1 there exists a coalition 
Sa E I To such that ,u(Sa) = a,u(S) and q (Sa) = aq (S). Asfis differentiable at ,u (T) , for 
every 0 < a < 1 we have 
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f(.u( TI Sa)) = f(.u(T)) - aVf(.u(T)) . .u (s) + o(a). 
As ~ E Core(v) , we have 
Hence, 
~ (s) ~ 'Vf(Jl(T)). Jl (S) + g(a) , 
where lim g(a) = O. Therefore ~ (S) :::; Vf(.u(T)) . .u (S) , and the proof is complete. Q.E.D. 
a-+o 
Let A be a subset of a linear space. A point Xo E A is called a center of symmetry of A 
if for every x EA, the point 2xo - x also belongs to A. Note that if A is bounded, there may 
be at most one center of symmetry. 
The following corollary is a direct consequence of Theorems 3.1 and 3.2. 
Corollary 3.3 
Let Jl = (Jll, ... , Jlm) be a vector of non-trivial measures in ca+ (A). Assume that 
f: 91.~ --; 91.+ is a non-decreasing concave function which is differentiable in int 91.~ and 
satisfies, Vf(Jl(T))» 0 and f(Jl(TI {an) = 0 for every a E Tj. Then the asymptotic 
nucleolus of the game v = f 0.u coincides with the center of symmetry of the subset of the 
core of v in which all the members of 'Fj receive the same payoff. 
§4 - Market Games 
In this section we apply Theorem 3.1 to games which arise in economic applications. 
We consider a pure exchange economy E in which the commodity space is 91. ~ . The 
traders' space is represented by the measure space (T,.E,A). We assume again 
that T = To U 'Fj, where Ta and 'Fj are non-empty and disjoint coalitions, 'Fj is a finite set of 
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atoms of A such that every subset of T] is in I , and the restriction of A to (To, Ir 0) is 
non-atomic. We will interpret the members of 1J as monopolists. Every trader t E T has a 
utility junction Ut :9t~ ~ 91+. An assignment in E is an integrable function x: T --; 91~. 
There is a fixed initial assignment W (w(t) represents the initial bundle density of trader t). 
An allocation is an assignment x such that f r xdA ~ f rW dA. A tramferahle utility 
competitive equilibrium (t.u.c.e.) of the economy E is a pair (x,p) , where x is an allocation 
and p E 9t~ , such that for all t ET, Ut (x) - p. (x - wet)) attains its maximum (over 9t~) at 
x = X(I). The measure <p (S) = f)ut (x(t)) - p' (x(/) - W(/))] dA (when the function 
Ut (X(/)) is integrable) is called the competitive payoff distribution; and p is the vector 
competitive prices. We assume the following 
(4.2) For every trader a E 1J there exists a commodity 1 ~ ka ~ m such that wk (t) = 0 for 
a 
every t ET'. {a} (where Wk denotes the ka -component of w). 
a 
The meaning of (4.2) is that every atom of A has a corner on one of the commodities 
in the economy. 
We restrict our analysis to two cases: (1) when every trader in E has the same utility 
function and (2) when E has a finite number of types. 
Denote by U the set of all functions u: 9t ~ --; 9t + which are continuous and concave 
on 9t ~ , continuously differentiable and increasing on the interior of 9t ~ and vanish on the 
boundary of 9t~ . Note that any differentiable neoclassical utility function is in U (see 
Definition 1.4.2 in Aliprantis, Brown and Burkinshaw (1989». 
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We first study the case in which all the traders in the economy E has the same utility 
function u: ~~ ~ R+. We assume that u E U and that u is homogeneous of degree one on 
m~ (note that, for example, any Cobb-Douglas utility function satisfies these assumptions). 
The Aumann-Shapley Shubik market game which is associated with the economy E (see 
Shapley and Shubik (1969) and Section 30 of Aumann and Shapley (1974» in this special case 
is defined by 
(4.3) v(S) = sup{fsu(X(t))dAlxiS an assignment such that fsxdA = fsCVdA} 
Proposition 4.1 
Assume that the economy E sati::,fies (-1.1) and (-1.2) and that evelY trader in E has the 
same utility function U E U which is also homogeneous of degree one. Then the market game 
v which is defined in (-1.3) has an asymptotic nucleolus If v which is given by 
(4.4) 
Moreover, there exists a competitive payoff distribution qJ which corresponds to a t. u. c. e. of 
J 
E sllch that If yeS) = "2 «p(S) for every S E ETo . 
We first note that for every SEE, v( S) = u( f s cv dA). Indeed, let SEE. Then by 
the definition of v, we have yeS) 2:: lids cv dA). Since u is concave and homogeneous of 
degree one, by Jensen's inequality, for every assignment x such that fsx dA = Is cv dA we 
have fsu(x (t)) dA::; udscv dA}. Therefore yeS) = udsW dA}. Now, since II vanishes on 
the boundary of ~~, by (4.2), for every a E 1] we have v(TI {an = udTl{a} w dA) = o. 
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Also the assumption that u is increasing in the interior of 9\ ~ implies that 'VurJ T m dl) » 0 . 
Thus the game v satisfies the requirements of Theorem 3.1 and therefore (4.4) is satisfied. Let 
b = f T m dl. Since u is homogeneous of degree one, by Euler's theorem 'Vu(b)· b = u(b). As 
u is concave, for every x E 9\~ we have 
u(x) 5, u(b) + 'Vu(b). (x - b) = 'Vu(b)· x . 
Therefore max (u(x)-'Vu(b).x)=O. Consequently, for every t ET we have 
xE9t~ 
max (u(x) - 'Vu(b)· (x -m (t))) = 'Vu(b)·m (t). 
XE9t~ 
Let <p = 'Vu(b) . f m dJ... Then <p is a competitive payoff distribution in E and If/ v(S) = f <p(S) 
for every S E IT 0 . Q.E.D. 
We now analyze the case when there is a finite number of traders' types in the 
economy E. Two traders are of the same type if they have identical initial bundles and 
identical utility functions. We assume that the number of different types of traders in 
1'0 is n. For every 15, i 5, n, we denote by Si the set of traders in 1'0 which are of 
type i. We assume that Si is measurable (i.e., Si E I) andl(Si) > o. The utility 
function of the traders of type i (J s is n) is denoted by ui, and their initial bundle by 
m i. We assume that for every 1 5, i s n, Ui E U and in addition ui is homogeneous of 
degree one. We also assume that for every a E Tj the utility function ua of the trader a 
is in U (but not necessarily homogeneous of degree one). The Aumann-Shapley-Shubik 
. market game which is associated with the economy E in this case of finite number of 
types is 
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where, X(S) = {x I x is an assignment such that f s XdA = f sO) dA} . 
Define a function f:9t~ ~ 9t+ by 
Since the utility functions of the traders are continuous and concave, it is easy to see 
that f is well defined and concave on 9t ~ . 
Lemma 4.2 
Let v be the market game in (4.5), then v(S) = fdsO) dA)for every SE I, 
wherefis given by (4.6). 
Let S E I. Assume first that S does not include 1]. Then by (4.2), f sO) dA 
belongs to the boundary of 9t ~. Since the utility functions of the traders in T vanish 
on the boundary of 9t ~ , we have v(S) = 0 and f ( f sO) dA) = O. So assume that 
We first show that v(S)2::f(fsmdA). Let (xa)aETjand (Xi);=1 suchthat 
n 
fds mdA) = LA({a})ua(xa)+ LUi(Xi)' 
aETj i=1 
Define an assignment x by x(t) = xt if t ET] and for every t E Si (J::; i ::; n) 
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otherwise 
Then 
n J XdA = LA ({anxa + LXi:::; J WdA 
ST'] S aE ] 1= 
Therefore v(S) ~ J s Ut (x(t)) dA. Since the ui are homogeneous of degree one, 
n 
Jsut(x(t)) dA = LA ({an lIa(xa) + LUi (Xi) = i rJSWdA ) 
aET] 1=] 
It remains to show that v(S) :::; i (J s cv dA). Let x be an assignment such that 
fsxd), = fswdA. For every a ET] let xa = x(a) and for every 1:::; i:::; n let 
Xi = Isns, x dA. Then 
n 
LA ({an Xa + LXi = fsxdA = Iscv dA 
a ET] i=] 
Therefore by the definition off, we have 
n id WdA)~ LA ({a})ua(xa)+ LUj(xi) 
S aET] i=] 
Since the lIj are concave and homogeneous of degree one, 
As x was an arbitrary assignment which satisfies f S x dA = f SW dA , we obtain that 
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Lemma 4.3 
The function fwhich is defined in (4.6) is continuously differentiable on 
We first show that f is differentiable at every point in the interior of 9\:1. Let 
y* E in! 9\~. Then from the definition offit is clear that f(y *) > O. Sincefis 
concave on 9\ ~ , it is sufficient to show that 0 f(y *) consists of a unique point. Let 
(X; ) and (x;)n be such that 
aET] 1=1 
n 
f(Y*)= LA({a})ua(x;)+ LUi(Xt) 
GET] i=1 
Since the utility functions of the traders are non-decreasing, we have 
n 
LA({a})x~ + Lx7 =y* 
i= 1 
Since f(y *) > 0, the assumption that the utility functions of the traders vanish on the 
boundary of 9\:1 implies that there exists j E T1 u {1, ... , 11} such that x; E int 9\ ~l . 
Assume first that 1~j~11. We will show that of(y*)couAx;). Let P Eof(y*). 
Then for every x E 9\ ~ we have 
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U /X) - U j(X ~) = Uj(X) + LA ({a})ua(x;) + LUi{X;) 
aeT] i~j 
- lIAx ~)- LA ({a})ua(x;) - LUi{X;) ~ 
a eT] i~ j 
f(X+ LA ({a})x; + LxtJ- f(Y*)~p,(x-x;). 
aeT] i~ j 
Thus p E Oll Ax;) and of(y *) C Oll Ax;). Since U jis differentiable at x;, we have 
for every x E 9t~ we define Uj(x) = A ({j})u/x). Then the above argument implies 
that c f(y *) = {'Viij (x j)}. Thus, in any case 0 f(y *) consists of a unique point, and 
therefore j is differentiable at y *. The assumption that the utility funcitons of the 
traders are increasing in int 9t': implies that 'VfrfTcvdAJ» o. Now sincejis 
concave on 9t~, it is continuous on int 9t'!!. Moreover, since the utility functions of 
the traders vanish on the boundary of 9t:1 it is easy to see thatfis also continuous on 
the boundary of 9t~. Now Proposition 39.1 of Aumann and Shapley (I 974) asserts 
that any continuous concave function on 9t ~1 which is differentiable on il1l 9t '!! is 
continuously differentiable in int 9t':. Thereforefis continuously differentiable on 
int 9t~ . Q.E.D. 
We are now ready to state and prove the main result of this section. 
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Theorem 4.4 
Assume that the economy E satisfies (l1), (4.2) and also 
(1) There is afinite number n of traders' types in To' 
(2) Theutilityfunctions u1, .. ·,un of the traders in 'Ia are in Uandinadditionthey 
are homogeneous of degree one on 91:1 • 
(3) The utility functions {lla} a ET] of the traders in Tj are in U 
Let f be the function which is given by (4.6). Then the market game v which is defined 
in (-1.5) has an a~ymptotic nucleolus IfI v which is given by 
Moreover, there exists a competitive payoff distribution qJ which corresponds to a 
. 1 
t.u.c.e. in the economy E such that IfIv(S) = -2 t;O(S) for evelY S E IT . 
() 
(4.7) follows from Theorem 3.1 and Lemmata 4.2 and 4.3. Denote 
b = f OJ d)' . Let (x ~) and (xt)n be such that 
T aET] 1=1 
Then by a similar argument to that which was used in the proof of Lemma 4.3, we 
obtain that for every t ET and x E 91~ 
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Since/is non-decreasing on 'R':, V/Ch) ~ O. Let 1::; i ::; m. Now if Xj* is on 
the boundary of 'RT, then Ui{Xn = 0, and thus by (4.8), Uj(x) - V/Ch) . x s. 0 for 
every XE'R~I. If Xj* Eint 'RT,then V/Ch) =VUj{x;). Sinceuj is homogeneous 
of degree one, VUj (xt). xt = Ui (xt). Therefore we again have by (4.8), 
Uj (x) - V/Ch) . x::; 0 for every x E'R': and thus 
max (Uj(x) - V/(h) . x) = 0 
XEm~1 
This implies that for every t E T 
max (uJx) - Vj(h)· (x - m (t))) = Vj(h)· m (I). 
X Em "..1 
Now by (4.8), for every a E 7J and t ET we have 
For every { ET let 
{
lIt (X*(tn-Vj(h).(x*(t)-m (t)) 
get) = 
Vj(b)· m (t) 
F or every S E I define rp (S) = f s gdJ.. Then rp is a competitive payoff distribution in 
1 
the economy E and for every S E IT we have IjIv(S) = -qJ(S). 
a 2 Q.E.D. 
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